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The	Land’s	Turn
PHILIP	WEINSTEIN
Faulkner	and	Ecology:	the	topic	may	seem	a	bit	willful,	an	attempt	to	align	“our	man”	with
some	contemporary	non-Faulknerian	preoccupation.	The	more	I	reflected,	however,	the	more
appropriate	this	topic	became.	Not	only	because	Faulkner’s	brooding	imagination	appears,
itself,	to	be	ecologically	oriented,	but	also	because	“ecology”	is	hardly	a	recent	concern.
Probably	derived	from	the	Greek	term	oikonomia	—home	management,	or
“economy”—“ecology”	involves	the	traffic	between	particular	(“home-based”)	needs	and	the
larger,	always	limited,	resources	available	for	meeting	those	needs.	Like	economy,	ecology
assumes	scarcity,	and	therefore	a	reasoned	deployment	of	limited	social	goods	and	natural
resources.	Concern	for	ecology	is	older	than	recorded	history	itself—is	a	staple	of	oral
cultures—and	the	“ecological”	element	of	Faulkner’s	work	attaches	to	his	most	atavistic
convictions.	The	“ecological”	is	the	predis-cursive	in	Faulkner’s	work	that	rebukes	the	endless
spewing	of	speech.1	It	is	no	accident	that	the	“ecological”	lodges	in	that	which	does	not	speak
—in	the	big	woods	that	resist	man’s	talky	invasion,	in	the	raging	river	that	punishes	any	attempt
to	cross	it,	in	the	mule	that	symbolizes	the	very	stubbornness	of	inertia.	Put	otherwise,	the
“ecological”	in	Faulkner	refers	to	a	territory	of	human	norms	premised	on	scarcity	and	shaped
to	a	noncapitalist	paradigm.2
Older	than	history:	all	oral	societies	managed	to	achieve	their	fundamental	goal—survival
—only	by	respecting	ecological	values.	In	his	study	of	African	societies,	British	historian
Basil	Davidson	notes	that,	throughout	the	1960s–1980s,	liberated,	postcolonial	native	regimes
sought	to	imitate	the	prestigious	economic	models	of	their	departing	conquerors	(British,
French,	Portuguese).	Such	models—based	on	a	post-Enlightenment	middle-class	and	a
technological	infrastructure	permitting	capitalistic	progress—proved	disastrous	in	Africa.	As
Davidson	characterizes	the	pre-colonial	practices	that	were	not	followed,	a	full-fledged
ecological	philosophy	emerges	into	view.	He	writes:	“Each	of	these	…	societies,	from	lineage
group	to	clan	to	cluster	of	clans,	had	to	shape	its	behavior	to	fit	its	environment,	its	possible
resources	in	food	and	shelter,	its	scope	for	political	development....	The	rules	had	to	be
explanatory	so	that	people	…	would	understand	why	survival	depended	upon	following
them....	Therefore,	they	had	to	be	the	fruit	of	painstaking	observation	and	analysis	of	soils	and
seasons	and	all	the	manifest	diversities	of	nature,	including	human	nature.	In	short,	they	had	to
be	severely	reasonable	…	the	very	reverse	of	the	blind	dictates	of	superstition	that	nineteenth-
century	Europeans	supposed	to	reign	supreme	on	the	‘dark	continent.’”3	The	all-important	goal
of	these	noncapitalist	cultures,	generation	after	generation,	was	sustainability,	not	progress.
Older	than	history:	oral	cultures	envisage	history	quite	differently	than	literate	ones	do.	With
respect	to	Christianity	this	difference	proved	decisive,	for	what	invading	Christian	colonizers
could	regard	African	natives	and	not	see	a	people	at	least	1500	years	behind	the	revealed
truth:	primitives,	not	yet	aware	of	the	good	news	that	Christ	brought	so	long	ago?	John	Mbiti
has	shown	that	many	African	languages	articulate	temporality	itself	in	ways	tellingly	different
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from	the	languages	of	the	progressive	West.	Most	African	verb	tenses,	he	shows,	focus	on	the
present,	the	immediate	past,	and	the	immediate	future;	the	other	tenses	speak	of	the	more	distant
(but	still	remembered)	past	and,	beyond	that,	the	sacred	departed	past	(the	realm	of	the	spirits).
No	verbs	exist	for	an	abstract	future	years	away	:	life	is	grasped,	instead,	as	a	concrete
phenomenon	moving	past	one,	backwards,	from	the	near	future	into	the	present,	then	to	the
recent	past	and	finally	to	the	distant	past.	The	seasons,	likewise,	are	demarcated	not	as
abstracted	months	on	an	abstracted	calendar,	but	as	activity-filled	periods—of	planting	or
harvesting	or	building—that	make	up	the	concrete	reality	of	the	passing	year.4
What	has	this	to	do	with	Faulkner?	Ask	the	trees,	the	river,	the	horses,	and	the	mules:	if	they
could	speak,	they	could	tell	you.	And	they	would	never	say,	as	Thomas	Sutpen	does,	“You	see,
I	had	a	design	in	my	mind…	.	To	accomplish	it	I	should	require	money,	a	house,	a	plantation,
slaves,	a	family—incidentally	of	course,	a	wife.	I	set	out	to	acquire	these.”5	“Design	…
acquire”:	no	nonwestern	culture	ever	committed	itself	to	such	abstract	conceptualizing,	such
insistent	mapping	of	future	time	and	space.	Sutpen’s	“design”	is	as	singular	in	its	pursuit	as
aboriginal	men’s	behavior	was	communal,	shaped	according	to	long-engrained	norms.6	And
shaped	at	a	level	deeper	than	conscious	thought	or	speech:	the	French	sociologist	Pierre
Bourdieu	describes	such	prediscursive	shaping	of	individual	behavior	as	habitus	.	Bourdieu’s
notion	of	habitus	dissolves	the	oppositions	between	individual	motive	and	social	limitation,
free	and	determined,	that	tend	to	polarize	Western	liberal	thought.	Instead,	habitus	involves
recurring	objective	conditions	which,	over	time,	individuals	have	unthinkingly	absorbed	into
their	own	reckoning,	turning	such	reckoning	into	active	dispositions.	Bourdieu	writes:
“Because	the	dispositions	…	inculcated	by	objective	conditions	…	engender	aspirations	and
practices	…	compatible	with	those	objective	requirements,	the	most	improbable	practices	are
excluded	…	as	unthinkable.”7	Boiled	down,	as	Faulkner	might	say,	to	six	or	eight	words,
viable	habitus	ensures	successful	ecological	practice.	Individuals	seek	what	can	be	achieved
within	the	available	resources.
Bourdieu’s	natives	act	normatively	(but	not	predictably:	they	are	still	free)	within	the
flexible	frame	of	their	habitus,	moved	by	dispositions	deeper	than	conscious	choices.	Bourdieu
describes	these	dispositions	as	“second	natures.”	“The	‘unconscious,’”	he	goes	on	to	claim,
“is	never	anything	other	than	the	forgetting	of	history	which	history	itself	produces	by
incorporating	the	objective	structures	it	produces	in	the	second	natures	of	habitus:	‘in	each	of
us	…	there	is	part	of	yesterday’s	man;	it	is	yesterday’s	man	who	inevitably	predominates	in	us,
since	the	present	amounts	to	little	compared	with	the	long	past	in	the	course	of	which	we	were
formed	and	from	which	we	result.	Yet	we	do	not	sense	this	man	of	the	past,	because	he	is
inveterate	in	us;	he	makes	up	the	unconscious	part	of	ourselves.’”	(79).8	Such	thinking	is	far
from	Freudian	individualism:	the	unconscious	is	our	forgotten	social	being,	not	our	repressed
personal	desires.	The	unconscious	part	of	ourselves,	the	part	rooted	deeper	than	choice,	the
part	unthinkingly	attached	to	yesterday’s	man	and	yesterday’s	world:	Bourdieu’s	habitus,	that
inertial,	long-gathering	resistance	to	the	new,	coils	at	the	heart	of	Faulkner’s	ecological
imagination.
One’s	image	of	Faulkner	does	not	reduce	to	the	reactive	traditionalist	this	model	might
suggest.	Rather,	the	oldest	strata	in	him,	so	to	speak,	is	ecological:	that	inertial	sense	of	things
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that,	scandalized	by	the	“abruption”	of	the	new,	seeks	to	escape,	or	to	rebuke,	such	bewildering
incursions.	His	Yoknapatawpha	County	thus	shapes	up	as	a	precarious	ecosystem	itself
established	only	by	the	inveigling	and	uprooting	of	a	native	population,	and	thereafter
menaced,	recurrently,	by	further	crises,	incursions,	these	driven	by	long-inculcated	convictions
and	practices	of	opposing	races,	classes,	and	regions.9	Put	otherwise,	Faulkner’s	work
achieves	its	gravity	because	the	wounds	to	body	and	spirit	it	records	seem	more	stubbornly
rooted,	less	open	to	therapy,	than	the	more	individualist	dramas	of	a	Fitzgerald	or	Hemingway.
Whole	ways	of	life	are	opposed	and	under	attack.	The	resonance	of	these	troubles	seems	to
intimate	the	wounded	land	itself—the	land	that’s	“going	to	turn	and	destroy	us	all	someday”
(AA	7)—a	kind	of	injury	that	goes	deeper,	and	lasts	longer,	than	mere	individual	pain.	What
makes	this	drama	intractable	is	that	the	agents	committing	and	receiving	the	damage	are
motivated	by	forces	and	orientations	located	beneath	thought.	Outrage	is	Faulkner’s	emotional
signature	because	his	protagonists	act	in	accordance	with	unthinking	cultural	training.	His	great
work	dramatizes	habitus	against	habitus,	an	agon	waged	between	the	yesterday’s	men
predominating	and	inveterate	in	the	men	of	today.	To	find	these	yesterday’s	men	he	needed	not
Jay	Gatsby	but	the	mountain	man	Thomas	Sutpen—not	the	tomorrow-ridden	world	of	urban
climbing	but	the	yesterday-suffused	world	of	a	rural	culture.
Habitus:	cultural	training	that	over	the	course	of	generations	shapes	individuals	deeper	than
spoken	discourse.	Even	Joe	Christmas	realizes	“that	a	man	would	have	to	act	as	the	land	where
he	was	born	had	trained	him	to	act.”10	If	it	took	generations	of	cultural	training	for	Colonel
Sartoris	to	find	it	normal	to	fire	that	gun	upon	unarmed	Nathaniel	and	Calvin	Burden,	it	took,
no	less,	generations	of	cultural	training	for	Nathaniel	and	Calvin	Burden	to	find	it	normal	to
place	themselves	in	front	of	Sartoris’s	gun.	Yoknapatawpha	County	serves	as	the	site,	thus,	of
long-brooded	scenarios	of	oppositional	training	confronting	each	other,	contesting	each	other,
and	(with	few	mediating	positions	available)	destroying	each	other.	Habitus	against	habitus,
both	inalterable.	Before	turning	to	this	violence	in	Absalom,	Absalom!	,	let	me	sketch	out	the
collision	of	opposing	habituses	in	Faulkner’s	work.	For	if	viable	habitus	just	means	a	culture
of	subjects	moving	efficiently	through	familiar	pathways	of	space	and	time,	the	Faulknerian
canvas	spectacularly	refuses	to	stage	precisely	this.	Rather	than	narrate	normative	movement,
Faulkner	attends	to	subject	motion	gone	dysfunctional,	incorrigibly	awry,	and	heading	toward
either	of	two	extremes:	slow	(too	slow,	intolerably	slow)	or	fast	(too	fast,	suicidally	fast).
Slow,	too	slow:	consider	the	ode	to	the	mule	in	Flags	in	the	Dust	.	“Steadfast	to	the	land	…
impervious	to	conditions	…	[embodying]	sheer	and	vindictive	patience	…	misanthropic	…
misunderstood	…	moved	neither	by	reason,	flattery,	nor	promise	of	reward,”11	the	mule
emerges	as	a	mute	signpost	of	long-ingrained,	precapitalist	Southern	realities:	daily	and
disfiguring	labor	upon	the	land,	a	patience	wrought	into	him	by	immemorial	repetitions,	a
gathered	stubbornness	of	identity	that	nothing	can	deflect,	that	we	recognize	best	when,
desiring	to	get	ahead,	we	try	to	hurry	him	up.	A	liminal	creature,	deeply	inert,	he	straddles	the
line	between	sleep	and	waking,	stasis	and	motion,	as	though	he	incarnated	the	inconceivable
slowness	of	natural	process	itself.	Immune	to	temptation,	he	is	eternally	what	he	is,	even	if	this
is	other	than	what	we	want	him	to	be,	seeming	to	symbolize	the	gritty	precapitalist	South,	and
to	rebuke	every	gadget	inventable	that	might	signal	progress,	getting	ahead,	rising.
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Change	mule	for	horse,	and	a	more	complex	pattern	emerges,	since	Faulkner’s	horses	are
both	too	slow	and	too	fast.	(The	latter	trait	emerges	unforgettably	in	the	spotted	horses	no	one
is	going	to	domesticate,	a	speed	that	intoxicates	and	disorients	the	peasants	motionlessly
regarding	them.)	Jewel’s	horse,	however,	reveals	both	more-than-human	speed	and	more-than-
human	resistance	to	human	control	over	that	speed.	“Then	they	are	rigid,	motionless,	terrific,
the	horse	back-thrust	on	stiffened,	quivering	legs,	with	lowered	head.”12	A	similar	man-horse
tension	recurs	in	Light	in	August	:	Joe	Christmas	desperately	beating	McEachern’s	horse,
trying	to	fly	to	Bobbie:	“The	stick	still	fell;	as	the	progress	of	the	horse	slowed	the	speed	of	the
stick	increased	in	exact	ratio....	Yet	still	the	rider	leaned	forward	in	the	arrested	saddle,	in	the
attitude	of	terrific	speed”	(LA	210).	Silhouetted	here	is	nature’s	inertial	resistance	to	furious
human	purpose,	frantic	human	design.	If	we	change	horse	for	dog,	we	get	the	haunting	scene	of
Houston’s	dog	blocking	Mink’s	attempt	to	put	Houston’s	corpse	away,	appearing	and
reappearing	(despite	Mink’s	ever	more	vicious	attacks	upon	it)	to	thwart	Mink’s	project.13	You
can’t	get	away	with	this,	such	animal	behavior	silently	says.	Or	in	Sutpen	language:	this	is	a
design	that’s	not	going	to	work,	it	goes	against	the	grain	of	inertial	nature	itself.	In	such	scenes
everything	hostile	to	the	puny	human	figure’s	insistence	on	imposing	his	will	seems	to	coalesce
into	the	figures	of	mule,	horse,	and	dog.14
Faulkner	critics	have	long	been	attentive	to	Faulkner’s	brooding	landscape,	likewise	silently
resistant	to	human	project.	Most	spectacularly,	there	is	the	raging	river	of	“Old	Man”	and	As	I
Lay	Dying	.	It	is	antagonistic	to	human	design;	you	can’t	submit	yourself	to	that	water	and
remain	yourself.	“The	clotting	which	is	you”	runs	the	risk	of	dissolving	“into	the	myriad
original	motion”	(AILD	110).	About	such	nonhuman	implacability	Doc	Peabody	reflects:
“That’s	the	one	trouble	with	this	country:	everything,	weather,	all	hangs	on	too	long.	Like	our
rivers,	our	land:	opaque,	slow,	violent”	(30).	The	inalterable	self-sameness	of	the	river
appears	here	as	more	elemental	than	human	project,	more	powerful	than	the	projectedness	of
human	project,	as	if	the	way	that	a	reality	(any	reality)	has	long	endured	as	itself	counts	for
more	than	the	way	any	character	may	press	it	to	alter.	Such	atavistic	self-insistence	recalls
Freud’s	proposal	of	an	instinct	older	than	the	pleasure	principle,	beyond	the	pleasure
principle:	“It	seems,	then,”	Freud	writes,	“that	an	instinct	is	an	urge	inherent	in	organic	life
to	restore	an	earlier	state	of	things	…	[thus	expressing]	the	inertia	inherent	in	organic	life.”15
Instinct	would	be	that	in	us	that	is	prior	to	our	identity	and	utterly	unteachable.	In	this	light	we
might	reflect	on	the	unparalleled	stubbornness	of	Faulkner’s	characters,	the	assumption	in	his
plots	that	whatever	you	are,	deep	down,	elementally—at	the	level	of	“central	I-Am’s	private
own”	(AA	112)—that’s	what	you’re	going	to	be,	all	the	way,	to	confrontation,	annihilation,
Gethsemane	and	crucifixion.	Faulkner’s	mixed-race	tragedies	refuse	the	end	run	attempted	in
the	plot	of	passing	,	as	though	such	a	progressive	way	of	sidestepping	race	trouble	amounted	to
a	refusal	to	grant	the	trouble	its	genuine,	long-gathered,	all-destabilizing	gravity.
This	inertial	stance	appears	recurrently	in	Faulkner’s	blacks,	where	it	has	a	range	of
registers.	“Too	slow”	is	how	Jason	Compson	reads	such	blacks,	all	blacks,	as	he	scornfully
muses:	“like	Roskus	the	only	mistake	he	ever	made	was	he	got	careless	one	day	and	died.”16
The	text	doesn’t	“forget”	such	scorn,	though,	and	later	Jason’s	own	frantic	motion	makes	him
come	a	cropper.	His	head	pounding	with	pain,	he	seeks	to	persuade	one	of	the	black	boys	in
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Mottstown	to	drive	him	back	to	Jefferson:	“	‘Is	you	do	one	wants	to	go	to	Jefferson?’	he	[the
boy]	said.	‘Yes,’	Jason	said.	‘What’ll	you	charge	me?’	‘Fo	dollars.’	‘Give	you	two.’	‘Can’t	go
fer	no	less’n	fo’”	(313).
Quentin	sees	similar	black	imperturbability,	and	while	it	is	similarly	out	of	his	reach	(he	is
no	less	frantic	than	Jason),	he	at	least	has	the	wit	to	admire	it.	“Unimpatient”	is	his	term	for
characterizing	the	unhurried	black	man	on	the	mule,	as	the	modern	train	rushes	Quentin	toward
Jefferson.	“Unimpatient”:	the	term	implies	an	ecological	capacity	to	retain	one’s	long-acquired
stance	toward	the	world	despite	the	speed-insistent	technologies	of	modern	capitalism,	to
manage—when	“patient”	is	no	longer	viable	given	the	ubiquitous	pressure—to	not	get	caught
in	“impatient”	but	rather	to	find	one’s	way	past	the	newfangled	obstacles,	back	into	a	patience
that	is	now	“unimpatience.”	Faulkner’s	poor	whites	sometimes	manage	“unimpatience”	as	well
—witness	Armstid	and	Winterbottom’s	traditional	jockeying	over	the	cultivator	in	Light	in
August	,	or	the	Bundrens’	implacable	delivery	of	Addie’s	body	to	the	earth	awaiting	it	(no
matter	the	obstacles).17	However	complicated	by	private	motives,	these	events	unfold
according	to	the	inertial	rhythms	of	shared	habitus.
A	willingness	to	rest	within	the	dimensions	of	one’s	long-inculcated	and	confirmed	identity:
it	is	no	accident	this	traditional	virtue	is	mainly	observed	in	Faulkner	by	its	breach.	Habitus
enters	his	fictional	world	as	rebuke,	as	resistance	to	change,	as	prejudice,	but	rarely	as	viable
norm.	Habitus	does	not	prosper:	Faulkner’s	protagonists	typically	shatter,	and	are	shattered	by,
habitus.	Yet	his	fiction	is	not	drawn	to	just	any	iconoclastic	character.	In	fact,	Faulkner’s	most
resonant	twentieth-century	habitus-destroyer—Flem	Snopes—is	represented	almost	wholly
through	the	lenses	of	others.	Could	it	be	because	this	figure,	expertly	at	ease	with	the	moves
required	for	acquisition	and	progress,	this	rural	capitalist,	is	simply	outside	the	field	of	long-
brooded	pieties	(of	habituses)	Faulkner	seems	to	require	of	his	subjects	when	he	chooses	to	go
in	deep?	Is	Flem	kept	representationally	at	arm’s	length	because,	deep	down,	he	has	no	long-
matured,	socially	inculcated	“central	I-Am’s	private	own,”	and	is	thus	immune	to	the	outraging
of	such	a	center?
By	contrast,	when	Lucas	Beauchamp	engages	in	his	own	Flem-like	form	of	legerdemain,
outwitting	the	whites	who	would	outwit	him,	he	is	swiftly	brought	back	into	line,	receiving
from	the	earth	an	ecological	rebuke:	“the	entire	overhang	sloughed.	It	drummed	on	the	hollow
kettle	…	and	boiled	about	his	feet	and,	as	he	leaped	backward	and	tripped	and	fell,	about	his
body	too,	hurling	clods	and	dirt	at	him,	striking	a	final	blow	squarely	in	the	face	with
something	larger	than	a	clod	…	a	sort	of	final	admonitory	pat	from	the	spirit	of	darkness	and
solitude,	the	old	earth,	perhaps	the	old	ancestors	themselves.”18	The	moving	earth	reveals	the
gold	coin	that	will	catalyze	Lucas’s	later	efforts	to	rise,	but	that	“admonitory	pat”	seems	to	say,
in	earth	talk,	“beware:	if	there	is	buried	treasure	here,	it	means	to	stay	buried.”	Lucas
eventually	realizes,	after	one	too	many	trials,	that	“to	find	that	money	aint	for	me”	(101).	The
very	phrasing	is	redolent	of	a	speechless	inertial	order	rebuking	the	human	desire	for	labor-
free	upward	mobility.
Slow,	too	slow:	elements	of	ecological	stasis	appear	as	the	rooted	resistance	to	violently
imposed	change;	they	serve	to	silhouette	the	abruption	of	fast,	too	fast.	The	shattering	that
occurs	when	events	of	break-neck	speed	burst	upon	traditional	practices	is	virtually	the
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hallmark	of	Faulknerian	narrative.	Remove	the	violence	of	the	too-fast	airplane	and	there	is	not
only	no	Bayard	Sartoris	or	Pylon	,	there	is	no	William	Faulkner	coming	back	to	a-now-
understood-as-terminally-too-slow	Oxford,	Mississippi.	You	can	no	more	imagine	his	work
prior	to	the	modern	technology	of	car	and	airplane	than	you	can	imagine	it	later	in	the
postmodern	technology	of	virtual	reality.	In	the	former	there	would	be	only	inertial	slowness
and	the	chicanery	that	abuses	it	(he	might	have	become	a	minor	Balzac),	in	the	latter	there
would	be	only	inhuman	speed	and	the	dizzy	subject-morphing	that	accompanies	it	(he	might
resemble	a	DeLillo).	Instead	his	moment	is	vintage	early	twentieth-century	modernism.	He	still
knows	(imaginatively	knows)	the	mind’s	dependence	upon	the	ecological	rhythms	of	a	culture’s
habitus,	but	he	knows	these	sanity-producing	rhythms	only	as	under	assault.
Flight	in	Faulkner	is	incandescent	because	its	speed	is	unmanageable.	For	Bayard,	for	the
pilots	in	Pylon	,	flight	means	the	ecstatic	risking—wrecking—of	identity.	In	early	Faulkner	the
speed	of	a	car	can	be	equally	destructive:	“She	[Temple]	sat	and	watched	rigidly	and	quietly
as	Gowan,	apparently	looking	straight	ahead,	drove	into	the	tree	at	twenty	miles	an	hour.	The
car	struck,	bounded	back,	then	drove	into	the	tree	again	and	turned	onto	its	side.	She	felt
herself	flying	through	the	air....	She	scrambled	to	her	feet,	her	head	reverted,	and	saw	[the	two
men]	step	into	the	road,	the	one	in	a	suit	of	tight	black	and	a	straw	hat....	Still	running	her	bones
turned	to	water	and	she	fell	flat	on	her	face,	still	running.”19
Too	fast:	Faulkner	is	not	only	drawn	to	scenes	of	uncontrollable	speed,	but	his	writerly
identity	emerges	as	one	who	can	write	speed,	the	speed	of	the	mind	hurtling	into	moments	for
which	it	has	no	preparation.	Benjy’s	bellowing	registers	the	anguish	of	being	moment-by-
moment	unprepared,	and	in	this	he	is	echoed	by	Quentin’s	“Wait	I’ll	get	used	to	it	in	a	minute
wait	just	a	minute	I’ll	get”	(115).	Stream-of-consciousness	technique	appears	(first	in	Joyce,
later	in	Faulkner)	as	that	use	of	language	appropriate	for	the	velocity	of	modern	life:
ungrammatical,	fragmented,	sharp	edged,	hurtling	into	the	past	before	it	is	even	fully	thought.
Stream-of-consciousness	revises	the	prose	of	realism	in	order	to	bring	it	up	to	technological
speed.
Such	speed	in	Faulkner	issues	into	wreckage,	violence.	Think	of	Joe	Christmas	careening
into	Bobbie’s	room:	“He	opened	the	door.	He	was	running	now;	that	is,	as	a	man	might	run	far
ahead	of	himself	and	his	knowing	in	the	act	of	stopping	stock	still.	The	waitress	sat	at	on	the
bed....	She	sat	with	her	face	lowered,	not	even	looking	at	the	door	when	it	opened....	And	in	the
same	instant	he	saw	the	second	man.	He	had	never	seen	the	man	before.	But	he	did	not	realise
this	now”	(214).	Not	just	that	he	gets	badly	beaten	about	thirty	seconds	after	this	passage,	but
beaten	by	a	man	he	has	never	seen.	Other	examples	of	violent	shock	in	Faulkner	will	occur	to
every	reader,	the	common	element	being	that	his	characters	never	do	get	used	to	it.
Too	fast,	too	slow:	the	shattering	of	expectation	(appropriate	subject-motion	through	space
and	time)	is	everywhere	in	Faulkner.	“Wait!”	Shreve	cries	out	in	Absalom!	—echoing	the
distress	of	all	first	readers	of	that	novel	who	cannot	catch	up	to	its	speed.	More,	Faulkner’s
dilemmas	don’t	“come	right”	even	if	you	do	wait.	Too	fast	is	forever	too	fast,	no	mediating
reforms	are	on	the	way,	and	“go	slow	now”	is	slower	than	anyone	seeking	reform	can
accommodate.20	The	race	dilemma	Faulkner	confronted	would	never	come	right	by	way	of	any
slowness	he	could	envisage,	just	as	the	inane	racial	advice	offered	to	Charles	Bon’s	son	by
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Grandfather	Compson	avails	nothing:	“and	your	grandfather	speaking	the	lame	vain	words,	the
specious	and	empty	fallacies	which	we	call	comfort,	thinking	Better	that	he	were	dead,	better
that	he	had	never	lived”	(AA	166).	Such	inalterable	wrongness,	such	culturally	mandated
disaster,	is	virtually	Sophoclean	in	its	gravity.	What’s	wrong	in	Faulkner	is	really	wrong.	I	turn
now	to	Absalom,	Absalom!	as	the	Faulknerian	canvas	that	plays	out	this	agon	on	the	grandest
scale.
There	are	at	least	six	different	settings	in	Absalom,	Absalom!	—this	is	the	Faulkner	novel
that	does	most	with	its	settings—but	I	shall	focus	on	the	ecological	charge	of	only	two	of	these
(West	Virginia	and	New	Orleans)	as	they	impact	a	third,	Jefferson.	As	Shreve	implies	through
his	refusal	to	let	Quentin	call	Sutpen’s	mountain	home	West	Virginia,	there	was	no	West
Virginia	in	the	early	1800s.	This	territory	becomes	West	Virginia	when,	on	the	eve	of	Civil
War,	it	repudiated	slavery—at	least	in	part	because	it	had	no	cotton	or	tobacco	crops
dependent	on	slavery—and	declared	its	separateness.	The	political	and	economic	concerns
motivating	this	separation	are	inseparable	from	ecological	factors:	an	entire	society	organizing
itself	differently	here,	with	different	work	rhythms,	different	landscapes	to	manage	and	thus
different	crops,	as	well	as	a	different	structure	of	class	and	race	formations	that	inculcate
subject	norms.	There	are	no	aristocrats	in	Absalom	’s	West	Virginia,	no	blacks,	no	insistently
defined	property	rights.21	It	is	a	sort	of	rough	Eden,	this	fantasied	mountain	territory	in	which	a
little	boy	grows	up,	innocent	of	difference.	The	others	he	sees	surrounding	him	are	of	his
essential	kind—maybe	stronger,	maybe	better	clothed,	but	still	versions	of	his	potential	self—a
commonality	of	roles	and	behaviors	that	function	as	habitus:	“Because	where	he	lived	the	land
belonged	to	anybody	and	everybody	and	so	the	man	who	would	go	to	the	trouble	and	work	to
fence	off	a	piece	of	it	and	say	‘This	is	mine’	was	crazy;	and	as	for	objects,	nobody	had	any
more	of	them	than	you	did	because	everybody	had	just	what	he	was	strong	or	energetic	enough
to	take	and	keep,	and	only	that	crazy	man	would	go	to	the	trouble	to	take	or	even	want	more
than	he	could	eat	or	swap	for	powder	or	whiskey”	(179).
I	say	“fantasied”	because	Faulkner	goes	beyond	sociological	sobriety	here,	imagining	a
culture	somehow	free	of	money	itself,	in	which	there	simply	do	not	exist	the	alienations	and
abstractions	Marx	aligns	with	all	Western	societies	premised	on	money	and	private	property.
As	always	with	successful	habitus,	the	culture’s	daily	realities	regulate	a	learned	normative
traffic	between	subjects	and	other	subjects—norms	absorbed	into	the	body’s	unthinking
practices.	A	man	stepping	into	a	ring	with	others	in	order	to	test	his	physical	mettle	is	one	of
those	practices,	and	surely	Sutpen’s	wrestling	with	his	slaves	is	as	much	an	act	of	mountain
nostalgia	as	it	is	a	demonic	assault	upon	Southern	pieties.	But	of	course	the	point	is	that	in	the
South	it	is	an	assault—the	South	where	the	black	slave	body	is	variously	dreamed	of,
despised,	and	beaten,	but	never	publicly	embraced	or	intimately	abused	like	white	bodies.
Sutpen	leaves	the	mountain,	but	the	mountain	does	not	leave	him.	It	is	“yesterday’s	man”
who	enters	that	ring,	an	entry	he	seems	to	propose	(as	often	with	Sutpen)	more	in	blankness
than	in	malice.	Likewise,	his	outrageous	proposal	to	Rosa	later	simply	spills	out	of	him;	it	is
hardly	calculated,	despite	Shreve’s	insistence,	to	blast	Rosa	out	of	his	orbit	(he	needs	her
cooperation	if	he	is	to	get	his	legitimate	son).	Rather	than	acting	like	a	demon	here,	he	appears
(as	with	Ellen	after	the	wrestling	match)	surprised,	bemused,	blank:	his	gestures	have	spurred
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responses	he	never	intended.	Is	it	too	much	to	speculate	that	we	see	in	him	not	Mr.	Compson’s
figure	of	agile	resourcefulness	(“Given	the	occasion	and	the	need,	this	man	can	and	will	do
anything”	[35]),	but	rather	the	reverse,	a	blank	and	disoriented	vertigo	born	of	too	much
traveling,	of	conflicting	habituses?	He	is	no	less	bewildered	in	Grandfather	Compson’s	office
in	1865,	wondering	what	mistake	he	made.	Grandfather	Compson	thunders	at	him:	“Didn’t	the
very	affinity	and	instinct	for	misfortune	of	a	man	who	had	spent	that	much	time	in	a	monastery
even,	let	alone	one	who	had	lived	that	many	years	as	you	lived	them,	tell	you	better	than	that?”
(213).	Put	otherwise,	how	could	you	not	have	learned	not	to	do	what	you	did?	Have	you	no
sense	of	what	is	appropriate,	what	goes	with	what,	what	follows	what?	These	are	the	questions
one	poses	to	a	man	deprived	of	what	we	call	common	sense,	a	man	without	habitus,	though	in
this	case	it’s	a	man	with	too	many	habituses	(as	he	had	too	many	sons):	one	habitus	that	says
you	get	in	the	ring	with	men	you	want	to	master,	another	habitus	that	says	you	refuse	to
acknowledge	the	very	existence	of	your	own	son	if	he	carries	a	speck	of	black	blood.	Nothing
in	Sutpen	seems	native	any	longer,	can	be	taken	for	granted,	nothing	that	might	appear
instinctive	(no	residual	feeling	for	Bon’s	distress,	for	example).	His	jostling	habituses	lose
their	regional	viability,	yet	continue	to	shape	him	at	a	level	deeper	than	choice,	directing	his
moves	rather	than	clarifying	his	mind.
Demonic,	Rosa	calls	him,	but	she	ends	her	chapter	with	a	more	revealing	description	of	his
disorder:	“Because	he	was	not	articulated	in	this	world.	He	was	a	walking	shadow.	He	was
the	light-blinded	bat-like	image	of	his	own	torment	cast	by	the	fierce	demoniac	lantern	up
from	beneath	the	earth’s	crust	and	hence	in	retrograde,	reverse	…	clinging,	trying	to	cling
with	vain	unsubstantial	hands	to	what	he	hoped	would	hold	him,	save	him,	arrest	him”
(139).	Terminally	maladaptive,	Sutpen	has	traveled	too	much.	Absorbing	the	ecological	norms
of	incompatible	cultures,	he	remains	baffled,	beneath	and	beyond	the	tactics	available	to
consciousness.	His	colliding	allegiances	cancel	each	other	out,	and	the	mountain	boy	who
trusted	his	hands	as	the	gauge	for	measuring	whatever	was	true	about	life	ends	his	own	life
utterly	confused	by	the	mess	he	has	made	with	his	“vain	unsubstantial	hands.”
If	West	Virginia	encountering	the	Tidewater	is	a	disaster,	even	worse	is	New	Orleans
transposed	upon	Northern	Mississippi:	the	ecological	nightmare	of	Charles	Etienne	St.	Valery
Bon’s	“environed	blood.”22	Born	in	a	New	Orleans	in	which	he	“could	neither	have	heard	nor
yet	recognised	the	term	‘nigger’,	who	even	had	no	word	for	it	in	the	tongue	he	knew	who	had
been	born	and	grown	up	in	a	padded	silken	vacuum	…	where	pigmentation	had	no	more	moral
value	than	the	silk	walls	and	the	scent	and	the	rose-colored	candle	shades”	(AA	161),	this
child	is	seized	by	Clytie	and	transported—without	explanation	or	even	a	shared	language—to
a	Northern	Mississippi	where	the	space	he	inhabits	has	altered	seismically,	beyond
assimilation:
(the	rags	of	the	silk	and	broadcloth	in	which	he	had	arrived,	the	harsh	jeans	and	homespun
which	the	two	women	bought	and	made	for	him,	he	accepting	them	with	no	thanks,	no	comment,
accepting	his	garret	room	with	no	thanks,	no	comment,	asking	for	and	making	no	alteration	in
its	spartan	arrangements	that	they	knew	of	until	that	second	year	when	he	was	fourteen	and	one
of	them,	Clytie	or	Judith,	found	hidden	beneath	his	mattress	the	shard	of	broken	mirror:	and
who	to	know	what	hours	of	amazed	and	tearless	grief	he	might	have	spent	before	it,	examining
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himself	in	the	delicate	and	outgrown	tatters	in	which	he	perhaps	could	not	even	remember
himself,	with	quiet	and	incredulous	incomprehension).…	(162)
Recognizing	yourself	in	a	mirror:	Jacques	Lacan	has	bewitched	a	generation	of	critics	into
seeing,	in	this	mirror	scene,	the	founding	institution	of	(Western)	culture	within	the	not-yet-
subject.	The	infant	sees	in	the	mirror	a	radiant	image,	centered	and	mobile,	of	who	he-is-to-be.
The	image	proposes	an	unattained	imaginary	wholeness	that	spurs	the	infant	into	the	social
framework	he	would	make	his	own.	The	mother’s	eyes	confirm	the	infant’s	desire	and	launch
the	forward-moving	progress	through	time	that,	for	Lacan,	is	simultaneously	alienation	and
“maturity.”	Either	way,	the	physics	of	the	scene	organizes	space	as	a	mirroring	frame	in	which
the	infant	projects	his	desire-fueled	image	of	himself-to-be.	The	drama	is	projective,
individualistic;	its	motor	is	orientational,	its	aim	patriarchal.	In	Lacan’s	argument	about	the
mirror	stage,	the	structure	of	a	culture’s	liberal	norms	is	being	encountered,	identified,	and
pursued.
Bon’s	son’s	mirror	operates	in	reverse.	It	shows	him	the	chasm	between	what	he	was	and
what	he	is,	each	stance	underwritten	by	generations	of	cultural	training.	Every	present	item	of
clothing	reads	as	the	betrayal	of	a	former	item	of	clothing.	His	New	Orleans-furnished	body
has	been	intolerably	displaced	by	his	Mississippi-furnished	body,	none	of	this	his	own	choice.
As	in	Lacan,	this	is	an	identity-launching	moment,	but	it	inaugurates	not	a	centering	but	an
implosion.	Charles	Etienne	St.	Valery	Bon	materializes	as	a	culturally	incoherent	being,	torn
between	here	and	there,	now	and	then.	He	has	no	ecological	model	that	might	resolve	this
ideological	tearing.	The	habituses	of	Puritan	Northern	Mississippi	and	Catholic	New	Orleans,
the	jagged	racist	present	and	the	harmonious	race-neutral	past,	share	him	equally	and	without
possibility	of	mediation.	He	joins	these	incompatible	orientations	in	the	form	of	crucifixion.
Identity,	as	always	in	Faulkner,	operates	as	social	coding	that	shapes	the	body;	and	Bon’s
son’s	body	is	marked	by	contradictory	social	scriptings	that	permit	no	erasures.	One	needs	an
infrared	light	to	read	the	black	man	in	this	white	man,	but	he	makes	it	easy	by	guaranteeing,
through	premeditated	acts	of	violence,	that	he	be	recognized	as	impossibly	both,	at	once.
Performing	white	and	black	codes	to	fiendishly	intelligible	effects,	a	cultural	semiotician
before	the	term	was	coined,	Charles	Etienne	chooses	for	a	wife	exactly	the	kind	of	black
woman	that	white	and	black	alike	will	decode	(for	opposed	reasons)	as	scandalous.	Alert	to
every	nuance	of	the	cultural	codes	that	entrap	him,	he	naturalizes	nothing,	learns	nothing.	Time
cannot	heal	him,	nor	space	accommodate	him,	nor	mores	fit	him;	his	clothes	are	irreparably
wrong	before	they	become	bloodied	as	well.	He	does	not	so	much	communicate	through
language	as	strike	through	gesture.	Time,	space,	mores,	clothes,	and	language	permit	the
functioning	of	cultural	habitus	only	so	long	an	organizing	culture	can	impose	its	norms.	By
contrast,	Absalom,	Absalom!	reveals,	for	its	characters	who	cross	cultural	boundaries,	an
impossible	living	space,	an	ecological	disaster.	As	with	Sutpen,	yesterday’s	child	rages	inside
Charles	Etienne,	lodged	speechlessly	in	the	most	intimate	physical	assumptions	of	his	New
Orleans	childhood,	these	at	war	with	the	most	intimate	physical	assumptions	of	his	Mississippi
adulthood.
“A	man	will	talk	about	how	he’d	like	to	escape	from	living	folks,”	Byron	Bunch	muses	in
Light	in	August	.	“But	it’s	the	dead	folks	that	do	him	the	damage.	It’s	the	dead	ones	that	lay
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quiet	in	one	place	and	dont	try	to	hold	him,	that	he	cant	escape	from”	(75).	The	dead,	I	suggest,
may	be	as	influential	in	Faulkner’s	fictional	world	as	they	are	in	any	African	oral	culture.	Hugh
Kenner	once	remarked	that,	to	produce	his	crucial	effects,	Faulkner	needed	a	multi-
generational	history;23	and	I	take	this	to	mean	that	Faulkner	has	an	ecological	imagination,
attuned	to	long-inculcated	traditions	about	how	individuals	move	in	space	and	time.	That
which	is	impersonal,	inertial,	group-formed—the	heavy	weight	of	time-soaked	norms
(however	prejudicial)—trumps	the	individualist	projects	of	today	and	tomorrow.	Yet
Yoknapatawpha	County	offers	no	positive	alternative	to	change,	no	viable	backwater	of
peaceful	continuities.	Traversed	by	speed	and	violence,	riddled	by	brutal	tensions	of	race,
class,	gender,	and	region,	it	is	a	microcosm	of	American	(indeed,	hemispheric)	troubles,	not	a
sanctuary	of	escape	from	them.	Surely	the	ideas	of	sanctuary	and	immunity	loom	so	large	in
Faulkner’s	work	precisely	because	he	was	unable	to	secure	them.
Faulknerian	ecology,	I	conclude,	means	something	grimmer	than	the	benign	causes	we
currently	group	together	under	the	notion	of	ecology.	Rather,	it	points	to	his	atavistic	sense	for
the	inertial,	for	impersonal	forces	immune	to	individual	will	and	likely	at	any	moment	to
torpedo	the	progressive	reach	of	individual	projects.	“Breathing	is	a	sight-draft	dated
yesterday,”	Will	Varner	notes	in	The	Hamlet	,24	that	which	surrounds	us	predates	and
outweighs	our	designs.	Such	imminent	shattering	catalyzes	Faulkner’s	imagination,	highlights
the	pathos	of	his	dreams	of	peace.	He	is	a	writer	of	would-be	habituses,	subverted	might-have-
beens.	His	most	compelling	psychological	territory	is	that	of	unhealing	wounds;	his	most
radiant	pain	is	that	of	the	inability	to	forget.	As	Rider	puts	it	eloquently,	“Hit	look	lack	Ah	just
cant	quit	thinking.	Look	lack	Ah	just	cant	quit”	(GDM	120).
Faulkner’s	work	is	marked	by	an	irrepressible	yet	doomed	desire	to	“quit	thinking,”	to	find
a	sanctuary	beyond	the	reach	of	thought,	to	escape.	Three	related	terms	for	this	hopeless	quest
are	immunity,	insanity,	and	intoxication.	His	most	memorable	characters	long	for	immunity,	and
it	cannot	be	accidental	that	three	of	his	protagonists—Benjy	Compson,	Ike	Snopes,	and	Jim
Bond—live	out	their	insanity	as	a	subjective	space	spared	the	outrages	endured	by	the	sane.
Faulkner	himself,	we	know,	sought	hopelessly	and	ritualistically	to	drink	himself	into	oblivion
—that	form	of	return-to-infancy	forgetting	(clothes	removed,	bottle	at	his	mouth)	that	ends	with
a	bursting	head,	a	cotton	tongue,	renewed	consciousness,	and	more	tormenting	memories.	We
are	the	lucky	ones	finally,	not	he,	that	his	projected	escapes	failed,	and	that	only	in	the	act	of
writing	itself—“in	the	raging	and	incredulous	recounting	(which	enables	man	to	bear	with
living”)	(AA	130)—was	he	able,	not	to	elude	his	demons,	and	even	less	to	face	them	down,
but	rather	to	engage	them	through	words,	and	live	to	tell	it.	In	his	tragic	work	a	dark	ecology
prevails.	The	rebuke	is	delivered.	The	wounded	land	itself	turns	and	destroys:	it	is	the	land’s
turn.	In	the	wake	of	such	disaster	nothing	gets	righted,	but	everything,	finally,	gets	written.
NOTES
1. Prediscursive,	yes,	but	likewise	historically	fueled:	the	pell-mell	progressive	upheavals
that	characterize	capitalism	rouse	what	I	am	calling	Faulkner’s	ecological	rebuke,	in	the	name
of	inertial,	sanity-confirming	routines.
2. Stephen	Toulmin	has	argued	at	length	that	the	Cartesian	model	underlying	Western
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modernity	is	anti-ecological.	In	its	rigid	separation	of	human	from	natural	domains—of	the
realm	of	freedom	and	spirit	from	that	of	law	and	matter—this	Cartesian	model	conceptualizes
the	material	world	as	an	unrelated,	objective	realm	passively	awaiting	subjective	mapping	and
control.	By	contrast,	ecological	thinking	begins	by	positing	human	subjects	as	irrevocably
immersed	within	shared	biological	and	physiological	networks:	such	subjects	sustain
themselves	only	by	sustaining	these	contextual	networks.	See	“The	Far	Side	of	Modernity”	in
Toulmin’s	Cosmopolis:	The	Hidden	Agenda	of	Modernity	(New	York:	Free	Press,	1990).
3. Davidson,	The	Black	Man’s	Burden:	Africa	and	the	Curse	of	the	Nation-State	(New
York:	Random	House,	1992),	80–81.
4. See	John	Mbiti,	African	Religions	and	Philosophy	(London:	Heinemann,	1969),
especially	chapters	1–2.	It	is	no	accident	that	ecological	thought	attaches	so	powerfully	to	the
realities	of	time	passing.	Preliterate	societies	foregrounded	what	modern	(capitalist)	societies
have	been	learning	the	hard	way:	that	the	survival	of	life	systems	is	inseparable	from	an
acceptance	of	the	processes	of	death	and	renewal	wrought	into	the	very	meaning	of	survival.
As	many	of	the	papers	in	this	volume	attest,	Faulkner’s	characters’	dreams	of	monumentality
and	immortality	are	incompatible	with	the	ecological	trajectory	of	all	living	(and	dying)	things.
Such	biological	change	is	not	only	normal	but	seems	to	be	hard	wired	into	the	systems
subtending	organic	life.
5. Faulkner,	Absalom,	Absalom!	(New	York:	Vintage	International,	1990),	212.	Subsequent
citation	from	Absalom	refers	to	this	edition;	page	numbers	will	be	indicated,	parenthetically,
after	the	citation.
6. However	foreign	to	the	norms	of	Jefferson,	Mississippi—as	well	as	to	the	norms	of	the
mountain	culture	where	he	grew	up—Sutpen’s	design	remains,	of	course,	normative	to	the	hilt.
He	takes	it	wholesale	from	the	Tidewater	practices	that	damaged	him	earlier,	and	he	never
thereafter	calls	its	“normality”	into	question.	For	this	reason,	preapproved	and	unchallenged,	it
shapes	his	later	behavior	in	the	manner	of	habitus.
7. Bourdieu,	Outline	of	a	Theory	of	Practice	(1972),	trans.	Richard	Nice	(Cambridge:
Cambridge	University	Press,	1977),	77.	Habitus	resembles	ideology	enough	for	the	reader	to
wonder	why	I	use	the	one	term	rather	than	the	other.	The	reason	is	that,	within	Western	liberal
discourse	(descending	from	Marx	and	amended	by	Althusser),	ideology	is	a	negatively	charged
term	that	tends	to	assume	a	subject’s	illusory	take	upon	the	real.	The	tonic	aspect	of	habitus	,
however,	is	its	positivity,	its	rootedness	in	the	social	imaginary.	Habitus	denotes	socially
inculcated,	unthinkingly	appropriate	modes	of	individual	behavior,	rather	than	the	mystified
stances	that	a	power	system	proffers,	as	ideology,	for	complicit	subjective	consumption.	Put
otherwise,	habitus	belongs	to	a	non-Western	vocabulary	of	social	trust,	even	as	ideology
belongs	to	a	Western	vocabulary	of	social	suspicion.	That	said,	it	is	all	too	easy	for	Western
critics	to	oversimplify	habitus	and	imagine	non-Western	societies	as	possessing	a	seamless
social	order	that	has	in	fact	never	existed.
8. Drawing	on	the	same	notion	of	unthinking	incorporation	of	past	attitudes	(physical	as	well
as	mental),	Henry	Bergson	writes:	“The	past	collects	in	the	fibers	of	the	body	as	it	does	in	the
mind	and	determines	the	way	we	walk	and	dance	as	well	as	the	way	we	think”	(Matter	and
Memory	[1896],	cited	in	Stephen	Kern,	The	Culture	of	Time	and	Space:	1880	–1914
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[Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	1983],	41).
9. Edouard	Glissant’s	Faulkner,	Mississippi	(trans.	Barbara	Lewis	and	Thomas	C.	Spear
[New	York:	Farrar,	Straus,	and	Giroux,	1999])	launched	a	more	extensive	investigation	of	the
American	South	within	the	larger	history	of	the	hemispheric	South—a	history	replete	with
colonial	invasions,	the	rise	and	fall	of	the	slave	trade,	and	the	commercial	pathways	linking
Europe,	Africa,	and	the	Caribbean	that	enabled	this	traffic.	It	is	increasingly	clear	that	any
polarity	pitting	the	American	South	against	the	American	North	both	reduces	the	South’s
complexity	and	furthers	the	illusion	of	U.S.	history	as	“exceptional.”
10. Faulkner,	Light	in	August	(New	York:	Vintage	International,	1990),	255.	Subsequent
citation	from	Light	in	August	refers	to	this	edition;	page	numbers	will	be	indicated,
parenthetically,	after	the	citation.
11. Faulkner,	Flags	in	the	Dust	(New	York:	Random	House,	1973),	267–68.
12. Faulkner,	As	I	Lay	Dying	,	in	Faulkner’s	Novels:	1930	–1935	.	(New	York:	Library	of
America,	1985),	9.	Subsequent	citation	from	As	I	Lay	Dying	refers	to	this	edition;	page
numbers	will	be	indicated,	parenthetically,	after	the	citation.
13. For	recent	commentary	on	Mink’s	dog	as	symptomatic	of	Faulkner’s	natural	world,	see
Theresa	Towner,	“Unsurprised	Flesh:	Color,	Race,	and	Identity	in	Faulkner’s	Fiction,”	in
Faulkner	and	the	Natural	World:	Faulkner	and	Yoknapatawpha,	1996	,	ed.	Donald
Kartiganer	(Jackson:	University	Press	of	Mississippi,	1999),	49–50.
14. It	should	be	clear	that	I	am	describing,	not	a	metatextual	reality,	but	rather	a	discursive
structure	operative	in	Faulkner’s	work.	As	such,	his	work	participates	in	a	(romantic)	genre	in
which,	however	assaulted	and	abused,	inhuman	nature	remains	an	implicitly	moralized	force,
capable	of	erupting	irresistibly	in	human	affairs	and	revealing	their	“puniness.”
15. Quoted	from	Beyond	the	Pleasure	Principle	,	in	The	Freud	Reader	,	ed.	Peter	Gay
(New	York:	Norton,	1989),	612.
16. Faulkner,	The	Sound	and	the	Fury	(New	York:	Vintage	International,	1990),	251.
Subsequent	citation	from	The	Sound	and	the	Fury	refers	to	this	edition;	page	numbers	will	be
indicated,	parenthetically,	after	the	citation.
17. As	these	examples	make	clear,	Faulknerian	“inertia”	is	never	just	a	phenomenon	of
“nature”:	it	is	shaped	by	differential	social	groups	who	have	managed	over	time	to	sustain	the
viable	conventions	I	have	been	calling	habitus.	Such	long-gathered	conventions	regulating	race
and	class	interaction	are	inherently	precarious,	vulnerable	to	the	“abruption”	of	colonial	and
capitalist	forces	that	may	be	released	(as	in	the	cases	of	Sutpen	and	Flem	Snopes)	by	the	entry
of	a	single	all-disturbing	figure.
18. Faulkner,	Go	Down,	Moses	,	in	Faulkner’s	Novels:	1942–1954	.	(New	York:	Library	of
America,	1994),	29–30.	Subsequent	citation	from	Go	Down,	Moses	refers	to	this	edition;	page
numbers	will	be	indicated,	parenthetically,	after	the	citation.
19. Faulkner,	Sanctuary	,	in	Faulkner’s	Novels:	1930–1935	.	(New	York:	Library	of
America,	1985),	205.	Subsequent	citation	from	Sanctuary	refers	to	this	edition;	page	numbers
will	be	indicated,	parenthetically,	after	the	citation.
20. “Go	slow	now”	is	of	course	Faulkner’s	notorious	phrase	of	the	early	1950s,
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admonishing	blacks	not	to	pursue	their	civil	rights	at	a	pace	swifter	than	their	actual	deserving.
For	unpacking	and	dissent,	see	Charles	D.	Peavy,	Go	Slow	Now:	Faulkner	and	the	Race
Question	(Eugene:	University	of	Oregon	Press,	1971).
21. As	Charles	Sydnor	puts	it	in	The	Development	of	Southern	Sectionalism	(Baton	Rouge:
Louisiana	State	University	Press,	1948),	“Most	of	the	opponents	of	slavery	lived	west	of	the
Blue	Ridge	Mountains—a	land	where	there	were	few	slaves,	a	land	whose	white	inhabitants
believed	that	they	had	been	abused	and	misgoverned	time	and	again	by	the	politically	dominant
east.	Most	of	the	defenders	lived	in	the	Tidewater	and	Piedmont,	where	there	were	more
blacks	than	whites”	(228).	Thanks	to	John	Matthews	for	this	reference.
22. The	following	argument	about	Charles	Etienne	de	Saint	Valery	Bon	draws	substantially
on	my	essay	“Cant	Matter/Must	Matter,”	in	Look	Away:	The	U.S.	South	in	New	World	Studies	,
ed.	Jon	Smith	and	Deborah	Cohn	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2004),	as	well	as,	slightly
altered,	in	my	forthcoming	study	entitled	Unknowing:	The	Work	of	Modernist	Fiction.
23. See	Hugh	Kenner,	A	Home-Made	World	(New	York:	Knopf,	1975),	205–6.
24. Faulkner,	The	Hamlet	,	in	William	Faulkner,	Novels	1936–1940	(New	York:	Library	of
America,	1990),	1019.
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